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5Executive summary
The innovative strength of a nation’s business sector is one of the key factors of that
nation’s ability to compete in the international dimension. Among other relevant input
factors, private investments in R&D are extremely important for boosting that
innovative strength. Due to the positive externalities (spillover effects) of business R&D
the social returns to these investments are higher than the private returns achieved by
the firms making the actual investments in R&D (R&D investors). A consequence of
this imperfection in the knowledge market is that firms tend to invest less in R&D than
is optimal from the social point of view. Because of this, the government stimulates
business R&D, among other things by financial incentives.
The main question dealt with in this paper is: what are the economic effects of these fi-
nancial government incentives? The answer is of particular importance with a view to
the question whether the government should intensify, or conversely, cut down on its
R&D incentives policy. The economic effects of these R&D incentives are determined
by a multitude of factors; factors which also tend to interact. In addition to the spillover
effects referred to above, the main decisive factors are: the extent to which the
government incentives really do lead to an increase in business R&D, and the direct
effects of this extra R&D on business performance. A total of 12 mechanisms are
distinguished, all of which have an effect on the economic effects of R&D incentives.
These twelve mechanisms are placed in a total framework in this paper.
An increasing amount of (national and international) empirical studies on the separate
partial  mechanisms has been published in recent years. These results are set out and
used in this paper to underpin the crucial coefficients of an applied general equilibrium
model called MESEMET-2. This empirically-based model is then used to calculate the
macroeconomic effects of an increase in government R&D incentives.
A simulation carried out with MESEMET-2 shows that an increase in the government’s
stimulation of business R&D leads to a considerable increase in gross value added of
enterprises. According to the model calculations, a government incentives increase of
0.1% of the gross value added in enterprises leads to an approximate 1.0% extra gross
value added in enterprises in due course. In other words: one extra guilder in
government incentives will result in about ten guilders extra gross value added in
enterprises in due course. On balance, the beneficial economic effects of R&D
incentives also result in an improvement of the budget balance of the government.
The positive economic effects of R&D incentives do not so much depend on the actual
size of the multiplier (the relationship between extra business R&D and the
government’s incentives), but are determined mainly by the highly beneficial effects of
the extra R&D on sales and the gross value added in enterprises. This is influenced
significantly by a positive effect of R&D on the total factor productivity. A direct effect
on export demand is also important: a greater foreign demand for innovative and high-
6quality products. The direct effect on demand leads to a higher export price. In return, a
terms of trade gain is achieved by enterprises, and this has a positive effect on
profitability and fixed capital formation by enterprises.
The impact on employment is relatively limited. This is resulting from the assumption
that in the longer term the labour market will clear completely due to wage adjustments
(a strong Phillips curve effect). This, in the current tight labour market situation, is in
every way a defensible assumption to make. The increase in economic growth due to
the extra business R&D is, in our analysis, not so much the result of a greater input of
production factors, but is chiefly due to an increase in productivity.
All in all, this paper shows that the economic effects of the government’s stimulation of
business R&D are particularly beneficial. The paper also sets out the mechanisms that
lead to this result, and which mechanisms are of particular importance in this respect.
71. Introduction
Investments by enterprises in R&D are very important for today’s knowledge-intensive
economy. R&D efforts contribute to the level of and utilisation of knowledge, which in
turn is crucial for the ability of enterprises to innovate products and production
methods. This ability to innovate is the key factor in international competition.
Innovations are necessary to achieve cost-efficiency, but also highly important in order
to maintain the required quality and originality of products. That investments in R&D
are useful and profitable has been demonstrated in economic research frequently. The
R&D efforts of enterprises have both direct and indirect economic effects. The R&D
carried out in any firm contributes to the performance of that firm itself, but due to
spillovers from that R&D also to the performance of other firms.
Although R&D expenditure in the Dutch business sector has increased over the past few
years, this R&D expenditure is fairly low in the Netherlands compared with other
OECD countries. This is one of the weak points of the Dutch economy at a time when
knowledge and innovative capacity are becoming increasingly more important for the
international competitive position of firms and for generating economic growth.
The government can stimulate business R&D, among other things, with financial
incentives. The existence of positive externalities from business R&D justifies this
government support to business R&D. Due to spillovers R&D efforts of firms
contribute far more to the economy than the private returns for the firms that carry out
that R&D. The social returns to business R&D are therefore higher than the private
returns. A consequence of this imperfection in the knowledge market is that firms tend
to invest less in R&D than is optimal from the social point of view. If left entirely to the
market, firms will allocate less resources to R&D than the socially optimal level. It
would therefore seem unwise, on economic theoretical grounds, to accept the relatively
low R&D expenditure by enterprises in the Netherlands.
The goal of this paper is to gain an insight into the economic effects of financial
government incentives for business R&D. These economic effects are determined by a
multitude of factors; factors which also tend to interact. In addition to the externalities
already mentioned, the main decisive factors are: the extent to which government
incentives really do lead to an increase in business R&D, and the direct effect of this
extra R&D on business performance. Many empirical studies have been done on the
various sub-aspects in recent years. In this paper we make an initial attempt to place the
available empirical knowledge within a total framework. Then, by means of model
simulations, we set out a picture of the macroeconomic effects of R&D incentives.
However, first of all we will take a brief look at the amount of business R&D carried
out in the Netherlands in comparison with other countries, and compare the amount of
financial government support to business R&D in a number of countries.
82. Business R&D in the Netherlands in comparison with other countries
An international comparison of R&D expenditure is usually made on the basis of R&D
intensity. This is an indicator which expresses R&D expenditure as a percentage of the
gross domestic product (GDP). In terms of R&D intensity, R&D expenditure in Dutch
enterprises has been lower than the average of 15 OECD countries since the beginning
of the nineties, while in the two decades prior to that, Dutch R&D intensity was (far)
above the average (Figure 1).1
Figure 1 R&D intensity enterprises (% GDP), the Netherlands and the average of
15 OECD countries, 1973-1998
Source: Nieuwenhuijsen (1999), updated on the basis of OECD (2000a) and recent CBS
figures.
The 15 countries were chosen on the basis of data availability for the study conducted
by Nieuwenhuijsen (1999) into the stock of R&D capital. See Table 1 for a list of these
countries.
It may thus be noted that the Netherlands only achieves a moderate score in the field of
business R&D expenditure. This is also apparent from Table 1 in which 15 OECD
countries are arranged in order of their R&D intensity. The Netherlands comes in the
                                                                
1 The OECD average presented in Figure 1 is a non-weighted average of the 15 OECD
countries. For the period after 1981 a weighted average is also available for the total
OECD area in which the R&D intensity in the different countries is weighted on the basis
of the total GDP (see CBS, 1999, p. 210; OECD, 2000a, p. 26). This weighted OECD
average is even considerably higher (in 1998: 1.54) because countries such as the United
States and Germany with a relatively high R&D intensity carry more weight.
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9ninth position. This is certainly a poor score for a nation that has the ambition of being a
knowledge economy, and by virtue of this fact alone should be in a relatively high
position.
Table 1 R&D intensity1 enterprises in 15 OECD countries; 1998 or most recent
other year
Country R&D
intensity (%)
Standardised R&D
intensity2 (%)
Sweden (1997) 2.77 1.44
Japan 2.18 0.85
United States 2.04 0.71
Finland 1.95 0.62
Germany 1.55 0.22
France 1.35 0.02
United Kingdom 1.21 -0.12
Denmark 1.20 -0.13
The Netherlands 1.05 -0.28
Ireland (1997) 1.03 -0.30
Canada 1.01 -0.32
Norway (1997) 0.95 -0.38
Australia (1997) 0.71 -0.62
Italy 0.55 -0.78
Spain 0.47 -0.86
1 R&D intensity = R&D expenditure as a percentage of the gross domestic product
2 Standardised R&D intensity = R&D intensity deviating from the average of the 15
OECD countries (1.33%)
Source: Nieuwenhuijsen (1999), updated on the basis of OECD (2000a) and recent CBS
figures.
The mediocre position of the Netherlands can be explained partly by the sectoral
structure of the Dutch economy. According to research carried out by Hollanders and
Verspagen (1998, 1999), the Netherlands continues to score low even if R&D
intensities are adjusted for differences in sectoral structure. Moreover, the Netherlands
scored much better in the seventies and eighties with a similar sectoral structure. Other
explanations, such as the relatively substantial public R&D in the Netherlands, and the
low defence-related R&D expenditure, do not alter the fact that private expenditure on
R&D is too low.
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R&D expenditure can be regarded as investments in the stock of R&D capital. Might
the Netherlands perhaps achieve a better score if we look at the accumulated
investments in R&D? It appears from a recent study conducted by Nieuwenhuijsen
(1999) that a similarly disappointing score is obtained for the Netherlands if the stock of
R&D capital is compared internationally. At a private R&D capital intensity (stock of
R&D capital in % of GDP) of 6.34% in 1995, the Netherlands is still in the ninth place
among the 15 OECD countries. The average of the 15 OECD countries is 7.05%,
whereby countries such as Germany, France, the US, Japan and Sweden are way above
the 10% mark. The knowledge built up in the Netherlands in the seventies and eighties
by investing relatively large amounts in R&D has meanwhile become obsolete and has
consequently been written off. Dutch enterprises will need to invest above the average
amount for several years in order to catch up in terms of R&D capital.
The picture for the Netherlands is not an unfavourable one for all parts of the
knowledge economy.2 The Netherlands has taken the lead in the EU as far as the
percentage of the population belonging to the ‘scientific and technological labour force’
(Human Resources in Science and Technology) is concerned (CBS, 1999). The
Netherlands also scores well regarding the total investment in intangible assets. These,
in addition to private and public R&D expenditure, include expenditure on education,
payments for foreign technology, marketing and software (CBS, 1999). Furthermore,
investments in ICT are reasonably high in the Netherlands in comparison with other
countries (OECD, 1999).
Nevertheless, output indicators indicate that the innovative strength of the Netherlands
is on the low side. For instance: the share in turnover of new or improved products in
Dutch industry, which stands at 25%, is considerably lower than the EU average of
above 32% (Eurostat, 2000).3 The growth rate of labour productivity in the Netherlands
is also low compared with many other countries (OECD, 2000b). Another sign of a too
low innovative strength is that the share of manufacturing value added realised in
technology-driven sectors in the Netherlands is relatively low, in contrast with the share
of marketing-driven and capital intensive sectors (European Commission, 1999). This
confirms the analysis in the Dutch industrial policy letter ‘Scope for Industrial
Innovation’ (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1999) that the Netherlands has relied
heavily on factor-driven growth, and will need to invest more in the near future in the
development of an innovation-driven growth pattern.4
                                                                
2 As also indicated by Hollanders and Ter Weel (2000) and CBS (1999), p. 12.
3 Previous Eurostat figures pointed out a European average of 31% (Eurostat, 1999; CBS,
1999). According to more recent and more complete Eurostat figures (2000) the EU
(excluding Luxembourg en Greece) averages 32,5%. These are figures for 1996.
4 This terminology is derived from Porter (1990). See also SER (2000), pp. 42-43 and 89-
90.
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This worrisome picture is confirmed in a study of Porter and Stern (1999). In a
comparison of the innovative capacity of 17 OECD countries made by these authors, the
Netherlands dropped from the eighth position in 1980 to the eleventh position in 1995.
If policy remains unchanged, a further decrease is expected down to the thirteenth
position by the end of 2005.
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3. Government incentives for business R&D
The government stimulates R&D expenditure by enterprises in a variety of ways,
among other things through a number of financial incentives. The main instruments
today are the WBSO (Research and Development Allowances Act), the BTS (Subsidy
Scheme for Industrial R&D Cooperation), the EET (Economy, Ecology and Technology
R&D Programme) and the TOK (Technical Development Credit). Table 2 gives an
insight into the amount of government support to business R&D by way of these
financial instruments. A total sum in the region of NLG 750 million was provided in
1997 (excluding firms with fewer than 10 employees that were not included in the
observations for CBS’s R&D statistics). As a percentage of total business R&D
expenditure, the government incentives over the past few years fluctuated around the
9%.
Table 2 R&D expenditure in the business sector and government support to
business R&D1,2
Year Business R&D
expenditure
(NLG million)
Government support
to business R&D
(NLG million)3
Share of government
support in business
R&D expenditure (%)
1970 1,336 58 4.3
1980 3,227 94 2.9
1990 5,808 615 10.6
1991 5,460 285 5.2
1992 5,393 239 4.4
1993 5,684 207 3.6
1994 6,422 573 8.9
1995 6,900 566 8.2
1996 7,364 684 9.3
1997 8,186 737 9.0
1 Financing by the European Union and the financing by (semi) public research
institutes is not taken into consideration.
2 Figures are in accordance with the observation threshold of the CBS in the R&D
statistics. Up to and including 1993 only firms with 50 or more employees, from
1994 also firms with 10-50 employees in manufacturing and mining and quarrying,
and from 1996 also firms with 10-50 employees in the remaining sectors.
3 Subsidies, loans (gross, i.e. not adjusted for repayments), and as of 1994 the fiscal
R&D facility WBSO. The WBSO figures are based on the ‘realised’ tax deductions
according to data from the tax authorities (taking the CBS’s observation thresholds
in the R&D statistics into account).
Source: CBS (R&D statistics data) and Senter (WBSO data).
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In Figure 2 we see that the relative amounts of government support fluctuated quite
strongly in the past. The sharp increase in the second half of the eighties can be
attributed to the subsidy scheme INSTIR (wage-cost subsidies for research personnel),
that was introduced in 1984 and expanded in 1987. This scheme was discontinued in
1991 and thus the government’s share in business R&D funding dropped considerably
after that date. This share started to increase again in 1994, mainly because of the tax
facility WBSO that was introduced in that year.
Figure 2 Share of government support in business R&D expenditure (%), 1970-
1997
Source: CBS (R&D statistics data) and Senter (WBSO data).
Does the Netherlands, in comparison with other countries, spend relatively much or
little on stimulating business R&D? The answer to this question depends to some extent
on whether or not fiscal instruments are included. Using the most recent data, it is
apparent that if fiscal instruments are excluded, then the Dutch Government spends
relatively little on business R&D incentives (Figure 3). If the fiscal instruments are
included, then we see that the Netherlands scores in the middle group with 0.10% of the
GDP at a scale which is comparative with that of France, the United States and
Australia.
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
 '70  '72  '74  '76  '78  '80  '82  '84  '86  '88  '90  '92  '94  '96
14
Figure 3 Government support to business R&D in % of GDP, 1997 or most recent
other year1
1 Including fiscal instruments: 1995 for Canada and France. Excluding fiscal
instruments: 1995 for Canada, France and Japan, 1996 for the United States and
Australia.
Source: calculations based on OECD (1999), pp. 38-39 and 134.
Work is currently under way in many countries on intensifying government policy that
aims to strengthen the knowledge intensity of the economy. This refers not only to
promoting a linkage between the public and the private knowledge infrastructure, but
also to making business R&D more financially attractive by way of grants and tax
facilities.5 Although the degree of financial incentives regarding business R&D from the
government is one of the factors that determine the location of R&D-intensive firms 6, an
intensification of the incentives policies in foreign countries does not warrant the same
being done in the Netherlands. The consequences of such government policy must be
judged on their own merits. In other words: whether the government should gradually
withdraw its policy on stimulating business R&D, or whether it should continue it or
intensify it, depends on the economic effects. In the following we therefore examine the
economic effects of government R&D incentives.
                                                                
5 Economic Policy Committee (2000).
6 Minne (1997).
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4. Schematic framework for the economic effects of stimulating business R&D
The relationship between government support to business R&D and the macroeconomic
performance is complex and depends on several different factors. The diagram below
has been used as a basis for providing insight into this complex relationship.
Figure 4 Government support, business R&D and economic effects
Let us first of all restrict ourselves to the mechanisms in force in the firms that actually
make the investments in R&D, the R&D investors. Research shows that government
support (1st arrow), in addition to a variety of other factors (2nd arrow), has an effect on
Government
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business R&D
R&D
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explanatory
factors
Business R&D
Effect on productivity
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the amount of business R&D.7 However, this R&D is not the ultimate goal of
government incentives, but only the means. The government’s concern is the economic
effects of the R&D. In this context we can distinguish two direct effects of R&D among
R&D investors: a productivity effect (3rd arrow) and an effect on the demand curve (4th
arrow).
R&D can lead to a higher level of productivity by bringing about an improvement in the
production process and higher product quality. The higher level of productivity implies
that a higher production volume can be achieved from a given input of labour and
capital. Since this lowers the price of the products or the price-quality ratio, the result
will be an increase in demand and consequently a higher actual production.
Product improvements and innovations can also lead to a direct increase in demand by
way of an outward shift of the demand curve. In addition to a productivity effect we can
therefore distinguish an effect on the demand curve. The background of this effect on
the demand curve is twofold. Firstly, improvements in quality are difficult to measure
and thus in practice they will not be expressed in full in productivity figures.8
Consequently, the better market position firms are able to achieve due to this
improvement in quality leads to an outward shift of the demand curve. Secondly,
product innovations can take place without there being any question of improved
quality. In that case, product innovations only contribute to a larger product variety. In
itself, this product innovation can also increase the demand for products of a firm and
thus lead to an outward shift of the demand curve.
By way of the productivity effect and the effect on the demand curve, investments in
R&D influence the micro-business performance of R&D investors (6th and 7th arrows).
This, among other things, relates to the effects on turnover, employment and the value
added of a firm. Yet this is only part of the story. As already stated in the introduction,
the positive externalities – by way of the spillovers – are the main driving force for the
government to stimulate business R&D. It is the effects of R&D on firms other than
those that actually invest in R&D that lead to the social return to these investments
being higher than the private return. These spillover effects (5th arrow), which in turn
can be broken down into productivity effects and effects on the demand curve, occur in
the other firms that do, and those that do not invest in R&D. They consequently
influence the micro-business performance of the R&D investors (8th arrow) and the
micro-business performance of the other firms (9th arrow).
The effects of R&D on the micro-business performance of the R&D investors and the
other firms determine together the macroeconomic effects on sales, value added,
                                                                
7 For an overview of the empirical results found in the national and international literature,
see Donselaar and Knoester (1999).
8 See, for instance, Griliches (1994) as well as the report of the American Boskin
Commission: Advisory Commission To Study The Consumer Price Index (1996).
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employment, investments, profitability, etc. (10th and 11th arrows). In this context, the
continued macroeconomic effect of R&D on wages and prices, for instance, must also
be taken into account, because of the feed back effects on business performance that are
resulting from this. Finally, in addition to the first-order effects described above we also
have second-order effects (12th arrow), because the changes in production and
profitability, in turn, influence the amount of business R&D (2nd arrow).
An increasing flow of empirical material has become available on the separate parts of
the process described above. The empirical results for these sub-aspects will be
discussed below, after which we shall present an overall picture of the economic effects
of R&D incentives on the basis of simulations using a macroeconomic model.
18
5. Effect of government incentives on R&D expenditure by enterprises
Donselaar and Knoester (1999) recently conducted a study into the determinants of
R&D expenditure by enterprises in the Netherlands (1st and 2nd arrows in Figure 4). A
regression analysis was used to determine which variables between 1972 and 1995
influenced the R&D intensity of enterprises. This study shows a positive influence on
R&D expenditure by enterprises of government financing of business R&D, the
profitability and solvency of enterprises, and the internationalisation of the economy.
The real interest rate was found to have a negative effect. A distinction in government
financing of business R&D was made between financing from the central government
and financing from (semi) public research institutes. Funding originating from central
government covers subsidies, loans and tax facilities for the purpose of stimulating
business R&D. Funding originating from (semi) public research institutes relates to
procurement of R&D, i.e. R&D assignments to enterprises, commissioned by (semi)
public research institutes.
An adjustment was made in the empirical estimations for five large multinational firms,
the so-called Big Five (Philips, Shell, Unilever, Akzo and DSM). These are the top five
firms with the highest R&D expenditure in the Netherlands, which make up for a major
part of the total R&D expenditure by enterprises in the Netherlands (in 1997 this was
slightly above 40% after a downward trend from above 70% in 1970).9 Estimates for the
total business sector, i.e. including the five major multinationals, did not produce
plausible results. The reason for this is that the R&D expenditure by the five large
multinationals has dominated the development of total R&D expenditure by enterprises
in the period 1972-1995, but cannot be explained accurately on the basis of macro-
variables for the Netherlands. In particular some specific developments that took place
in Philips (heavy investments in the megachip project between 1986 and 1988, and
budget cuts related to the Centurion operation at the beginning of the 1990s) seem to
distort the estimation results considerably. Confidential CBS data made it possible to
make an adjustment for the Big Five firms, in turn making it possible to come up with a
theoretically and empirically plausible explanation for the development of business
R&D expenditures in the Netherlands.
The estimation results are shown in Table 3. The most explanatory variables are the
extent of internationalisation and financial incentives from the central government. A
significant multiplier of 1.04 (t-value 9.1) was found for the latter.10 This means that, on
average, every single guilder in government financing has led to more than one guilder
in extra R&D in the business sector during the period investigated for the purpose of
this study (1972-1995).
                                                                
9 CBS (1999), p. 89.
10 This multiplier of 1.04 was adjusted for repayments of TOK loans.
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Table 3 Determinants of business R&D intensity1
Coefficient t-value (absolute)
internationalisation2 0.0045 10.1
financing from central government3 1.04 9.1
financing from (semi) public research
institutes 3,4
1.18 5.6
dummy for the years 1994 and 19955 0.061 4.3
real interest rate -0.009 3.7
solvency6 0.0065 2.7
1 The equation was estimated including the constant and explains 97% of the total
variance of the explained variable. This variable is defined as follows: business
R&D (of firms with 50 or more employees) excluding the Big Five firms, as a
percentage of gross value added in enterprises.
2 The ratio between the volume of relevant world trade and the volume of gross value
added in enterprises; index (1990 = 100).
3 Exclusive of the Big Five firms, as a percentage of gross value added in enterprises.
4 This relates to procurement of R&D, i.e. R&D assignments to firms, commissioned
by (semi) public research institutes.
5 The dummy has been included because of the introduction of new methods of
observation by the CBS in 1994, resulting in the detection of a higher number of
firms engaged in R&D, particularly smaller firms in the service sector.
6 Share of equity capital in total capital (%).
Source: Donselaar and Knoester (1999).
A multiplier greater than zero implies that, on balance, due to government facilities
additional R&D is carried out in the business sector. Regarded as such, the empirically-
found multiplier of 1.04 can be deemed considerably high, certainly if it is taken into
account that when providing these schemes it is impossible to prevent part of the
government-provided funding from going towards R&D that would still have been
carried out without them. Moreover, a pure interpretation of the result requires that it is
taken into account that the government funds are subject to profit taxation. A part of the
government financing therefore flows back into the treasury in the form of higher taxes
on profit. If an adjustment is made to compensate for this, then the result is a ‘net’
multiplier of 1.8. The ‘gross’ multiplier of 1.04 corresponds with the values found
earlier in the international literature, whereby it should be noted that the results
presented in the literature vary considerably.
Although the R&D carried out in enterprises is not in itself a goal of government policy,
it is important that we can observe that government financing really does lead to extra
R&D in enterprises. Yet ultimately, it is the effect on the economy that counts. The
main aspect is the extent to which government financing of business R&D contributes
to the economic performance of enterprises. This will be looked at in the following
chapters.
20
6. Direct effects of R&D on business performance
Van Leeuwen and Nieuwenhuijsen (1998a, 1998b) studied the direct effect of R&D on
business performance for firms in Dutch manufacturing (3rd and 4th arrows in Figure
4). They used linked firm-level data from R&D statistics and Production Statistics
(CBS) for the years 1985, 1989 and 1993. Van Leeuwen and Nieuwenhuijsen estimated
a model in which the demand and productivity effect of business R&D is included.
They applied the capital approach to R&D, in which R&D expenditure is seen as an
investment that contributes to the stock of R&D capital. Depreciation of the R&D
capital stock was taken into account in connection with the obsolescence of knowledge.
An annual 15% depreciation on the previous year’s stock of R&D was assumed. This is
a customary percentage in all the relevant literature.
The study shows that R&D has favourable effects on the business performance of R&D
investors (6th and 7th arrows in Figure 4). According to the study, a 10% increase in
R&D capital leads to a 2.5% extra value added, 2.0% extra employment and 0,5% extra
labour productivity in the firms that carry out the R&D. The direct effect on demand
plays a dominant role here. Although these percentages express the effects of a 10%
higher R&D capital stock, they can also be interpreted as percentual effects of a
structurally 10% higher level of R&D expenditure. When structurally 10% more R&D
is carried out, the stock of R&D capital will in due course also be 10% higher.11
There has been little attention in the literature to the direct effect on demand. From the
literature we see that it is common practice to measure the effect on productivity only.
This is a serious limitation given that it does not take the characteristics of product
innovations sufficiently into account. The study carried out by Van Leeuwen and
Nieuwenhuijsen demonstrates that the direct effect on demand is a very important factor
when analysing the effects of R&D on business performance. This is hardly surprising
when we realise that approximately 70% of R&D expenditure in Dutch manufacturing
is on product innovations.12
                                                                
11 Initially, the stock of R&D capital will increase quite strongly. However, because of the
associated increase in depreciation this increase will progressively slow down. In due
course, a new balance will be achieved and the stock of R&D capital will cease to grow.
The new stock of R&D capital in that new balance will have grown just as much in terms
of percentage as the R&D expenditure itself.
12 Van Leeuwen and Nieuwenhuijsen (1995).
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7. Spillovers and total effects of R&D on business performance
In addition to the direct effects on the business performance of R&D investors,
spillovers are important for the effects of R&D on business performance (5th, 8th and
9th arrows in Figure 4). Three different kinds of spillover can be distinguished:
knowledge spillovers, ‘rent’ or market spillovers and network spillovers.13
Knowledge spillovers, also referred to as direct spillovers, occur if the knowledge
developed by one firm becomes also available to other firms, for example by way of
personnel moving from one employer to another, publications, informal contacts, or the
reverse engineering of products. This knowledge can be used to copy or imitate
innovations, and can also be used in a new innovation process and thus lead to a new
technology. The second sort of spillover is the ‘rent’ or market spillover. These
spillovers occur by way of transactions and are embodied in goods and services.
Purchased goods are improved by the supplier’s R&D activities, while this is often not
fully reflected in the price. The third sort of spillovers are the network spillovers. These
spillovers arise when the commercial or economic value of a new technology is
dependent upon the development of related technologies. This concerns the synergy
achieved if the innovations of different firms are complementary.14
A great deal of research has been carried out world-wide into R&D spillovers. This
research is practically always concerned with the productivity effects of R&D. Spillover
effects on the demand side are almost completely ignored in the literature. Furthermore,
spillover effects are usually measured at sectoral level. Spillovers among firms
operating in the same sector are then incorporated in the effects of the sector’s own
R&D. While the actual results of the various studies appear to differ considerably, in
most studies a substantial spillover effect has been found.
Table 4 gives an overview of various studies, in which a distinction is made between the
direct and the indirect rate of return to R&D. These rates of return reflect the marginal
productivity of R&D capital, i.e. the extra production that becomes possible at a given
input of labour and capital by increasing the R&D capital stock by a single unit. The
direct rate of return to R&D is often referred to in the literature as the private return to
R&D, which is the return to R&D carried out in the sector or firms itself. The indirect
rate of return is the return outside the sector or firms itself, by way of spillovers. The
direct and indirect return to R&D add up to the social rate of return to R&D.15 While the
                                                                
13 Jaffe (1996), Haakman (1999).
14 This, for instance, is the case in the ICT sector in which developments in hardware,
content, IT services and (telecommunications) infrastructure tend to reinforce one
another.
15 These social returns are interpreted here as returns to the economy; the positive effects of
new technologies on the environment and health care, for instance, are not taken into
account.
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table only gives a small selection of the studies carried out in this field, it does show
that high values are generally found for both the private (the direct) return and the
indirect return to business R&D.
Table 4 Direct and indirect rates of return to R&D; the results of various studies
Author(s) Data Period Direct rate of
return
Indirect rate of
return
Terleckyj (1980) 20 manufacturing
sectors in the US
1948-1966 25-27% 81-183%
Goto and Suzuki
(1989)
50 sectors in
Japan
1978-1983 26% 80%
Griliches and
Lichtenberg
(1984)
193 manufacturing
sectors in the US
1959-1968
1964-1973
1969-1978
20-76%
11-58%
30-31%
insignificant
90%
insignificant
Scherer
(1982, 1984)
87 sectors in
the US
1964-1969
1973-1978
insignificant
29-43%
64-74%
71-147%
Van Meijl (1995) 30 sectors in
France
1978-1992 15-30% 47%-480%
Source: Roelandt, Gerbrands, Van Dalen and Van Sinderen (1996) and Grosfeld (1997).
Mohnen (1996), on the basis of an extensive literature overview, concludes that the
spillover effects set out in the literature average about 50 to 100% of the direct effects.
In other words: the social returns to R&D are, on average, 50-100% higher than the
private return for the firm or the sector actually carrying out the R&D. In a previous
literature overview, Nadiri (1993) reaches similar conclusions regarding the magnitude
of the spillovers. He concludes that the private rate of return to R&D in the literature
comes up to an average of 20-30%, and that the social rates of return often vary from 20
to over 100%, with an average somewhere close to 50%.
Mohnen (1996) adds to the results found in the literature that the social rates of return
are often underestimated given that the spillovers are usually only calculated for a
limited number of sectors and/or firms. Spillovers to the services sectors are rarely
taken into account, while it are the services sectors in particular that ‘absorbs’ a great
deal of the technology from manufacturing sectors.
With regard to the Netherlands, research into spillovers is still scarce. Two studies were
recently published in which the spillovers of R&D were measured for the Netherlands.
These are the studies of Jacobs, Nahuis and Tang (1998, 1999) and Soete and Ter Weel
(1999). Calculations were made in these studies of the average values of the influence
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of a sector’s own R&D, and that of the R&D from other sectors. Soete and Ter Weel
restricted themselves to knowledge spillovers, in which the flows of knowledge
between the different sectors are modelled on the basis of a technology flow matrix; use
was made of the patent figures issued by the European Patents Office (EPO). In the
study carried out by Jacobs, Nahuis and Tang, an attempt was made to measure both
knowledge and market spillovers, but the methodology followed by these authors
mainly concerns market spillovers given that the relationships between the different
sectors are modelled on the basis of intermediate deliveries.
The study carried out by Jacobs, Nahuis and Tang covers the whole business sector, in
which a distinction is made between seven manufacturing and four non-manufacturing
sectors. The study carried out by Soete and Ter Weel looks only at the manufacturing
industry, which for the purpose of the study is divided into 22 sectors. Both studies
investigate the effects of R&D on the total factor productivity, i.e. the potential
production at a given input of labour and capital in the production process. Neither of
these studies pays attention to direct effects on demand.
Both studies investigate the effect of a sector’s own R&D on the total factor
productivity and the effect of R&D carried out in other sectors. The capital approach to
R&D is taken, in which the R&D expenditure in successive years contributes to the
stock of R&D capital. Depreciation is taken into account. Both studies assume an
annual depreciation of 15% on the R&D stocks of the previous year.
Soete and Ter Weel (1999) found an elasticity of 0.07 for R&D carried out in the sector
itself, and a 0.10 elasticity for R&D carried out in other sectors. This means that a 10%
increase in R&D expenditure in all manufacturing sectors in the longer term (when the
higher level of R&D expenditure has been fully accumulated in the stock of R&D
capital) would have a total effect of 1.7% on the total factor productivity in
manufacturing, the greater part of which, namely 1.0%, can be attributed to spillovers
between the different sectors.
Jacobs, Nahuis and Tang (1998, 1999) found much larger effects. For R&D carried out
in the sector itself they estimated an elasticity of 0.35 and for R&D carried out in other
sectors they estimated an average elasticity of 0.18. Considering that these estimates
relate to the whole business sector this means that a 10% increase in R&D expenditure
in all sectors of the Dutch business sector would, in due course, lead to a 5.3% increase
in the total factor productivity of the business sector in the Netherlands. This result is
high in comparison with other research. Of note is that the R&D expenditures in the
services sector have a major effect on the total factor productivity of the Dutch business
sector according to the estimation results, while it only makes up for a limited part of
the total R&D expenditure carried out by firms in the Netherlands (about 20%). This
can be queried from a theoretical point of view.
24
A study carried out by Coe and Helpman (1995) is also of relevance to obtain an
indication of the effect of R&D on the total factor productivity of the whole business
sector. On the basis of a regression analysis for 22 OECD countries, including the
Netherlands, Coe and Helpman investigated the effect on a country’s total factor
productivity of R&D carried out in the domestic business sector and R&D carried out
abroad. They made a distinction between the G7 countries and 15 smaller countries.
This was done because spillovers from abroad will be relatively more important for the
total factor productivity for smaller countries than for large countries, and the effect of
one’s own R&D will be less in smaller countries because the spillovers in smaller
countries will to a large extent fall abroad. This is confirmed in the results of the
regression analysis. For the G7 countries Coe and Helpman found an elasticity of 0.234
for R&D carried out in one’s own country. For the 15 smaller countries, this elasticity is
0.078.16 The latter implies that 10% extra business R&D in the Netherlands would in
due course lead to a 0.78% higher total factor productivity in the Dutch business sector.
This was based on an annual 5% depreciation on R&D capital. If, as an alternative, the
more customary percentage of 15 is used, then the elasticity for domestic R&D for the
15 smaller countries stands as 0.109 and for the G7 countries at 0.247.
As was stated in Chapter 6, very little attention has been devoted to the direct effects on
demand in the international literature. At the macro level it is particularly the direct
effects on demand in terms of export that are important given that they lead to a larger
total demand for domestic products. Direct demand effects on competing imports are
also relevant, but quantitatively of less importance. There are two empirical studies
available that provide an indication of the magnitude of the direct effects of R&D on the
export demand for the Netherlands: one study conducted by Ioannidis and Schreyer
(1998) for 22 individual manufacturing sectors, and one by Van der Linden (1997) at
the macro level.
In a regression analysis for 10 OECD countries, including the Netherlands, Ioannidis en
Schreyer (1998) investigated the direct effect of R&D on the export market share in 22
different manufacturing sectors. A distinction was made between 11 high-tech and 11
low-tech sectors. Whether a sector belongs to a high-tech or a low-tech sector is
determined on the basis of the sector’s R&D intensity. The R&D variable used was the
relative stock of R&D capital which was defined as the stock of R&D capital in one’s
own country relative to the trade-weighted average of foreign competitors. The effects
were measured as elasticities, and while the elasticities found for the different sectors
apparently differed quite substantially, a significant effect was found for 9 of the 22
sectors. This applies for 8 of the 11 high-tech sectors. A total picture for the whole of
manufacturing can be obtained by weighting the elasticities found for the various
sectors on the basis of the share of these sectors in the total exports of the
                                                                
16 The elasticity for foreign R&D in Coe and Helpman’s study depends on a country’s
import share in GDP. For instance: this is calculated at 0.033 for the US and for the
Netherlands at 0.158 (based on the year 1990).
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manufacturing industries. This weighted elasticity is indicative of how much the export
demand would increase in the whole of manufacturing if in all sectors the stock of R&D
capital were to increase by 1%. For the Netherlands this results in a weighted elasticity
of 0.36.17 In other words: a 10% extra R&D capital in all sectors of Dutch
manufacturing (to be achieved in the longer term through a 10% structural increase in
R&D expenditure) would have a 3.6% direct effect on Dutch manufacturing’s exports.
Ioannidis and Schreyer also made an attempt to find spillovers in this sense between the
various sectors, but these could not be detected. However, there may be no significant
conclusions drawn in this respect because, as indicated by Ioannidis and Schreyer, this
may be caused by measurement and econometric problems.
In a regression analysis at the macro level, Van der Linden (1997) studied the direct
effect of the relative R&D capital stock (the R&D capital in one’s own country in
comparison with a weighted average of the competitors) on a nation’s export
performance. The extent to which the relative stock of R&D capital in the business
sector directly influences a country’s export performance was investigated for 15
countries, including the Netherlands. A significant effect was observed. We can deduce
from the best explanatory equation that 10% additional business R&D in the
Netherlands would have a 6.0% direct effect on Dutch exports in the longer term.18
                                                                
17 Source for the export shares: OECD (1999), p. 172-173. These export shares relate to the
year 1996.
18 This is based on the level of R&D expenditure in the business sector in the Netherlands in
1997.
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8. Macroeconomic effects of business R&D
Several studies into the productivity effects and the direct effects of business R&D on
the export demand were discussed in the previous chapter. Table 5 sets out the
implications of these studies in terms of productivity and exports from a (structural)
10% increase in R&D expenditure among Dutch enterprises.
Table 5 The long-term effects of 10% more business R&D in the Netherlands
according to various studies
Increase in the total
factor productivity (%)
Increase in export
demand (%)
Soete and Ter Weel (1999) 1.7 (manufacturing)
Jacobs, Nahuis and Tang (1999) 5.3
Coe and Helpman (1995) 0.78-1.09
Ioannidis and Schreyer (1998) 3.6 (manufacturing)
Van der Linden (1997) 6.0
The next question to ask is how a productivity effect and a direct effect on export
demand affect the economy (10th and 11th arrows in the diagram shown in Figure 4). A
macroeconomic model can be used to obtain an insight into this effect. This chapter
presents a picture of the macroeconomic effect of business R&D based on a simulation
using the MESEMET-2 model. This is an updated and extended version of MESEMET
(‘MacroEconomic Semi Equilibrium Model with Endogenous Technology’), developed
several years ago by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs.19 Before looking at
MESEMET-2 in greater detail, let us first of all take a look at MESEMET.
MESEMET is an applied equilibrium model in which the relationship between
technology and the economy is modelled comprehensively. This is an upgraded version
of the MESEM model developed by Van Sinderen (1990, 1993) which incorporates
technology and builds further on the previous model-based analyses of Den Butter and
Wollmer (1992) and Den Butter and Van Zijp (1995). The model is based on theory and
empirical studies in the literature and takes 1992 as the base year. MESEMET was
inspired by the new (modern) growth theory in the sense that technological
development is regarded as an endogenous factor, dependent on economic variables.
Technology in the traditional neo-classical growth theory is exogenous. In this view,
technological development is realised outside the economy and descends upon the
economy as ‘manna from heaven’.
                                                                
19 Van Bergeijk, Van Dijk, Haffner, Van Hagen, De Mooij and Waasdorp (1995), Van
Bergeijk, Van Hagen, De Mooij and Van Sinderen (1997), Van Hagen (1994).
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In MESEMET, a higher level of R&D intensity raises the level of GDP but not the long-
term growth rate of the economy. This is contrary to the endogenous growth models that
have emerged from the new growth theory in which economic growth is permanently
higher. This is connected with the production function on which MESEMET is based,
namely a (nested) production function with constant returns to scale in labour and the
different sorts of capital, i.e. physical capital, technology capital and human capital.
Endogenous growth models are based on constant returns to scale in the various kinds
of capital only (the so-called reproducible production factors, as distinguished from the
non-reproducible production factor of labour) which in this view is the result of the
positive externalities (spillovers) of knowledge development.20 In this regard, a more
traditional approach was chosen for in MESEMET because – as yet – empirical research
has provided little support for the hypothesis of the endogenous growth models (Van
Bergeijk et al, 1995, p. 12).
Both R&D’s productivity effect and the direct effect on the export demand are taken
into account in MESEMET. To this end, the stock of technology capital (which is
largely equivalent to the stock of business R&D capital) is included in the equations for
the production capacity and in the exports equation. In the Netherlands, the stock of
technology capital is assumed to consist for 80% of business R&D capital and for 20%
of R&D capital of (semi) public institutes. This percentage for the (semi) public sector
is considerably lower than the sector’s share in the total R&D expenditure in the
Netherlands (45% in 1997). The reason is that (semi) public R&D is only partly geared
towards the business sector and consequently only partly contributes to the production
capacity and the business sector’s innovative capability.
The productivity effect of R&D in MESEMET is based on empirical results taken from
the literature. In MESEMET, a 10% increase in the stock of business R&D capital leads
to a 0.9% higher total factor productivity in the business sector. Of this, 0.7% is a direct
effect of the extra R&D, while 0.2% is the result of a side-effect on the stock of human
capital. This takes into account a positive effect of R&D activities at the knowledge
level of workers (learning by designing); a positive effect which is subsequently to the
benefit of productivity. The productivity effect of 0.9% included in MESEMET is in
line with the empirical results for the Netherlands found by Coe and Helpman (1995). It
is also in line with the effect observed by Soete and Ter Weel (1999) for manufacturing
industries. However, the result for the total business sector arrived at by Jacobs, Nahuis
and Tang (1999) is far above this figure.
While the literature offered no directly usable empirical estimates for the direct effect
on the export demand at the time of constructing the MESEMET model, various
empirical studies did show an important effect of technology on the exports position.
MESEMET takes into account a direct effect of R&D on the export demand by
including the relative stock of technology capital in the exports equation. This variable,
                                                                
20 See, for instance, SER (1995), pp. 22-25.
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referred to as the relative innovation capacity, expresses the stock of technology capital
in the Netherlands compared with that of foreign countries. Prior to this, Den Butter and
Van Zijp (1995) made use of theoretical insights to estimate the elasticity for a similar
variable at 1.0. MESEMET presented something in line with this, the difference being
that in addition to the relative stock of technology capital, the relative stock of human
capital is also taken into account because it may be expected that this too will have a
direct effect on the export demand. The underlying idea is that not all improvements in
quality are the result of specific R&D efforts, but that, more generally, the knowledge
level of the labour force will also exert an influence in this respect. In conformity with
Den Butter and Van Zijp (1995), the sum of the elasticities of both direct demand
effects in MESEMET is set at 1.0. This implies that a 10% increase in both the relative
stock of technology capital and the relative stock of human capital also has a 10%
positive effect on exports. An elasticity of 0.4% has been chosen for the relative stock
of human capital. According to a study carried out by Reininga (1994) this is the share
of human capital in Dutch exports. An elasticity of 0.6 was subsequently taken for the
relative stock of technology capital.
Considering that the share of business R&D capital in the total stock of technology
capital in the Netherlands is set at 80%, the elasticity of 0.6 for the relative stock of
technology capital in the exports equation results in an exports elasticity for business
R&D capital of 0.48. This means that a structural increase in business R&D expenditure
in the Netherlands (in comparison with abroad) of 10% will, according to MESEMET,
have a 4.8% direct effect on exports in the longer term. This percentage is well in line
with the outcomes (shown in Table 5) of the studies carried out by Ioannidis and
Schreyer (1998) and Van der Linden (1997) after MESEMET had been developed. The
outcomes of these two studies confirm that R&D has a significant direct effect on the
export demand and also underpin the elasticity chosen in MESEMET for the direct
effect of technology capital on the exports position.
The original MESEMET was updated and extended in MESEMET-2.21 The original
model was calibrated with 1992 as the base year. In MESEMET-2 the base year is 1997.
This is the most recent year over which R&D data are available.22 The main extension
in MESEMET-2 is that the empirically estimated equation for R&D expenditure by
enterprises of Donselaar and Knoester (1999) was incorporated in the model (for this
equation see Table 3 in Chapter 5). The explanatory variables in this equation were
linked to other variables in the model. For instance: the solvency of enterprises was
made dependent on the profit ratio and subsequently related to the model’s original
                                                                
21 Donselaar, Van Sinderen and Verbruggen (2000).
22 Data published in CBS (1999).
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profit variable, the capital income of enterprises.23 In addition to this extension of the
model, other components of the model were also refined. Equations for production
capacity and exports equations were basically left unchanged. Also in MESEMET-2
does a 10% extra business R&D have a 0.9% positive effect on the total factor
productivity in the longer term, and a 4.8% direct effect on the export demand. The
main equations for simulations with respect to R&D are set out in Appendix 1.
Table 6 Simulation with MESEMET-2; the effects of 10% more business R&D in
the Netherlands (cumulated deviations from the base path; model
version with exogenous business R&D)
1 5 10 20 Long
term
gross value added enterprises (volume) % 0.17 0.69 0.98 1.16 1.20
gross domestic product (volume) % 0.15 0.61 0.86 1.02 1.06
exports of goods and services (volume) % 0.52 1.78 2.41 2.77 2.86
imports of goods and services (volume) % 0.41 1.59 2.25 2.60 2.67
private consumption (volume) % 0.04 0.48 0.94 1.19 1.24
gross investment enterprises (volume) % 0.40 1.15 0.99 0.87 0.84
R&D expenditure enterprises (volume) % 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
stock of technology capital enterprises (volume) % 1.80 6.29 8.63 9.81 10.00
stock of human capital (volume) % 0.06 0.32 0.51 0.66 0.73
stock of physical capital enterprises (volume)1 % 0.03 0.38 0.60 0.74 0.77
labour supply % 0.10 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
employment enterprises % 0.15 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.23
unemployment (% of labour supply) D -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
labour productivity enterprises % 0.02 0.44 0.73 0.92 0.97
nominal gross wage rate enterprises % 0.31 1.68 2.64 3.19 3.31
real gross wage rate enterprises % 0.13 1.00 1.67 2.09 2.20
price of domestic goods and services % 0.18 0.68 0.97 1.10 1.11
price of value added enterprises % 0.32 1.20 1.69 1.93 1.95
gross capital income enterprises (real) % 0.38 1.12 1.27 1.29 1.26
budget balance government (% GDP) D 0.12 0.48 0.68 0.80 0.83
current account of balance of payments (% GDP) D 0.19 0.58 0.74 0.84 0.86
1 Excluding physical capital related to R&D.
                                                                
23 In MESEMET-2 solvency is related to the profit ratio on the basis of the following
empirical relationship taken from the study carried out by Donselaar and Knoester
(1999): SOL = 0,148 WQ + 0,673 SOLt-1 + 13,07. SOL denotes solvency and WQ the
profit ratio which is defined as the net profit from production in the Netherlands as a
percentage of the net value added (also see Kusters, 1994).
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Table 6 presents the outcomes of a simulation using MESEMET-2 and reveals the
effects of business R&D in the model. A model version was used for this simulation in
which the R&D expenditure is exogenous. This implies that there is no feedback in the
model via the R&D expenditure itself.
A 10% increase in business R&D (structural, i.e. the higher level continues year-in-
year-out), according to MESEMET-2, results in the longer term in a 1.20% extra gross
value added in the business sector. This beneficial effect is realised in particular via
higher exports, which, in the longer term, will rise by 2.86%. The higher export level is
due partly to the direct effect on the export demand, and partly to the higher total factor
productivity which increases production capacity.
While the direct effect on demand has a direct effect on exports it also leads to a higher
price level as a result of the increased demand. Therefore, the ultimate effect on exports
is much smaller than the original impulse from the direct effect on exports. The larger
production capacity has, on the contrary, a downward effect on the price level. This
means that, on balance, the price level increase is limited and thus the extra production
that becomes possible due to the higher production capacity can also be sold. On
balance, the domestic price level increases by 1.11% in the longer term.
The higher domestic price level means that a terms of trade gain is achieved in the
business sector and this has a positive influence on profitability. In combination with
the higher production volume, this leads – because of higher investments – to a 0.77%
increase in the physical stock of capital goods in the business sector (excluding physical
capital related to R&D). The larger stock of capital goods subsequently contributes to
the production capacity of enterprises.
The effect on the supply of labour is also important for the ultimate effect on production
capacity. The model assumes a fully clearing labour market in the longer term, and thus
the reaction of the labour supply in the longer term is determinative for the effect on the
employment situation. In the simulation, the supply of labour increases in the longer
term by 0.19%, resulting in a 0.23% increase in employment in enterprises. Decisive for
the effect on the supply of labour is the change in the real gross wage rate. This variable
increases in the simulation by 2.20% in the longer term, having been made possible by
the increase in labour productivity and the terms of trade gain, two elements that
generate financial leeway for a higher gross salary for employees.
In the longer term, the higher real wages (plus linked benefits) lead to a substantial
increase in private consumption, 1.24%, which in turn gives an extra impulse to the
demand. The increased expenditure, plus the price increase on the domestic market, lead
to a considerable increase in imports which, calculated in volumes, increases almost as
strongly as the exports. However, the terms of trade gain gives rise to a 0.86% increase
in the balance of the current account of the balance of payments in the longer term.
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The budget balance of the government also improves considerably; by 0.83% of the
GDP in the longer term. The higher real wages play a major role here. After all, higher
wages lead to higher taxes and social security contributions for the government, and the
increased production volume obviously makes a significant contribution as well. We see
quite clearly here that extra R&D has a very beneficial effect on the budget balance of
the government.
Although the effect on the gross value added in the business sector of 1.20% in the
longer term may be qualified as very beneficial, the effect on employment is limited.
This is due to the fact that MESEMET-2 is a general equilibrium model in which it is
assumed that the labour market will clear completely in due course by way of wage
adjustments (a strong Phillips curve effect). Initially, the higher level of R&D
expenditure has an important beneficial effect on employment, particularly because of
the direct effect on the export demand. This effect declines in due course because of the
wage adjustments.
However, whether the labour market really (always) will clear completely is still open
to discussion. For instance, the CPB analyses are currently based on a wage equation in
which the level of unemployment does not keep the wage rate down until the labour
market fully clears, as in MESEMET-2, but in which the unemployment level only has
a once-only effect on a wage rate that will be achieved in the longer term (a weak
Phillips curve effect).24 If such a wage equation is applicable, then an increase in
employment will result in the longer term as appears from a sensitivity analysis made
with MESEMET-2 using an alternative wage equation (see Appendix 2). The value
added then also increases more than is the case with a fully clearing labour market.
When interpreting the results we furthermore must realise that MESEMET-2 is a linear
model, calibrated on the basis of the situation in 1997. Consequently, the model is less
suited to simulate major changes from the base path. This means that the model can be
used to simulate the effects of, for example, 10% more business R&D, but is not
intended for very large impulses of, say, 100%. In such a case, diminishing returns from
R&D must be taken into account. The more R&D is carried out, the less the effects of
extra R&D that are to be expected. Hall (1996) states that the most highly promising
projects are selected first before moving down to projects with less profitable prospects.
Kealy (1996) puts forward the argument that technology is becoming constantly more
complex, and consequently firms have to invest higher and higher sums in R&D in
order to make progress.25 Because of the diminishing returns from R&D, the effects of a
100% extra R&D can be considerably less than 10 times the effect of a 10% extra R&D.
                                                                
24 See for example CPB (1997).
25 Conversely, as indicated by Bartelsman and Hinloopen (2000), ICT could again increase
the returns from R&D.
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9. Macroeconomic effects of government incentives for business R&D
Given the amount of business R&D in the Netherlands (1.413% of the gross value
added in enterprises in 1997) the result of the simulation presented in Chapter 8 implies
that, in the longer term, one guilder extra in R&D will produce 8.5 guilders worth of
extra value added in enterprises in the Netherlands.26 The subsequent question is: what
is the effect of government R&D incentives? To calculate this, the empirically-
estimated R&D equation in the study conducted by Donselaar and Knoester (1999) has
been incorporated in MESEMET-2.
As stated in the foregoing, Donselaar and Knoester’s study came up with a multiplier of
1.04 for the effect of government incentives on R&D expenditure in the business
sector.27 Besides, government financing of business R&D also has a direct positive
effect on the profitability of firms, and this subsequently has a positive effect on the
solvency of enterprises, one of the other variables in the empirically-estimated R&D
equation. In addition to these direct effects of government financing of business R&D,
the feedback effects on R&D expenditure are also important (12th arrow in the diagram
shown in Figure 4). The main one being the positive effect on R&D expenditure that
results from an increase in value added.28 Finally, it is important that the higher level of
profitability, as a result of the government financing of business R&D, also has a
positive influence on fixed capital formation by enterprises which in turn has a
favourable effect on the economy.
Table 7 shows the results of a simulation made with MESEMET-2 in which the effects
of government R&D incentives are quantified. The simulation presents the effects of
government R&D incentives amounting to 0.1% of the gross value added (at factor
costs) in enterprises which, on the basis of the gross value added in 1997, is NLG 579
million (= 7% of R&D expenditure by enterprises).
                                                                
26 The simulation was based on an assumed 10% higher business R&D which, on the basis of
the base year 1997, is 0.1413% of the gross value added in enterprises. This impulse has an
effect of 1.20% in the longer term on the gross value added in enterprises: 8.5 times as high
as the increase in R&D expenditure.
27 The multiplier of 1.04 was the result of an empirical estimate for the business sector
exclusive of the Big Five firms. This was deemed applicable for the total business sector in
MESEMET-2. It is not known how the multiplier for the Big Five firms relates to that for
the other firms. Due to the lack of this information it was decided to use the same multiplier
for the Big Five firms as for the other firms.
28 This is taken into account in the empirically-estimated R&D equation by expressing the
R&D variable as a percentage of the gross value added in enterprises. This implies an
elasticity of 1.0 between the amount of gross value added and R&D expenditure.
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Table 7 Simulation with MESEMET-2; the effects of government R&D
incentives amounting to 0.1% of the gross value added of enterprises
(cumulated deviations from the base path; model version with
endogenous business R&D)
1 5 10 20 Long
term
gross value added enterprises (volume) % 0.07 0.48 0.75 0.92 0.98
gross domestic product (volume) % 0.06 0.43 0.66 0.81 0.86
exports of goods and services (volume) % 0.18 1.17 1.75 2.09 2.17
imports of goods and services (volume) % 0.17 1.12 1.71 2.03 2.09
private consumption (volume) % 0.03 0.37 0.77 1.00 1.05
gross investment enterprises (volume) % 0.22 1.04 0.91 0.84 0.85
R&D expenditure enterprises (volume) % 3.69 7.57 7.60 7.57 7.54
stock of technology capital enterprises (volume) % 0.66 4.27 6.37 7.42 7.54
stock of human capital (volume) % 0.02 0.23 0.40 0.54 0.61
stock of physical capital enterprises (volume)1 % 0.02 0.30 0.53 0.71 0.79
labour supply % 0.04 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.16
employment enterprises % 0.06 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19
unemployment (% of labour supply) D -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
labour productivity enterprises % 0.01 0.30 0.56 0.74 0.79
nominal gross wage rate enterprises % 0.12 1.16 1.99 2.49 2.60
real gross wage rate enterprises % 0.05 0.67 1.26 1.65 1.75
price of domestic goods and services % 0.08 0.49 0.73 0.84 0.84
price of value added enterprises % 0.13 0.85 1.28 1.48 1.48
gross capital income enterprises (real) % 0.45 1.13 1.29 1.31 1.27
budget balance government (% GDP) D -0.01 0.27 0.46 0.57 0.60
current account of balance of payments (% GDP) D 0.06 0.35 0.51 0.59 0.61
1 Excluding physical capital related to R&D.
The simulation shows as a result that the gross value added in the business sector rises
by almost 1.0% in the longer term. This implies that, according to this simulation, one
guilder spent on stimulating business R&D produces approximately 10 guilders extra in
gross value added (at factor costs); this can be regarded as very favourable. It is obvious
that this is primarily because of the favourable economic effects of business R&D, as
we saw in the simulation in the previous chapter. In combination with a 1.04 multiplier
for the effect of government R&D incentives on business R&D expenditure itself, R&D
incentives have a very positive impact on the economy. It is also interesting to see that
the budget balance of the government improves by 0.60% of the GDP in the longer
term. In other words: the simulation shows that R&D incentives bring money in instead
of costing the treasury money.
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That the effects of a one-guilder incentive on the gross value added (9.8 guilders) is
higher here than corresponds with 1.04 times the 8.5 guilders in extra value added
produced in the longer term by one guilder extra in R&D we saw in the simulation in
the previous chapter, can be attributed to the various indirect effects or by-effects of
R&D incentives. First of all, the R&D expenditure in the simulation apparently
increases slightly more than corresponds with the direct effect of government incentives
on R&D expenditure in the business sector.29 This is mainly because of the positive
effect of the higher value added on business R&D expenditure. Secondly, it is important
that the government financing of business R&D not only has a direct positive impact on
business R&D, but also on fixed capital formation in enterprises thanks to a positive
effect on the profitability. This latter effect is, in terms of magnitude, by far the most
important one to explain the aforementioned difference.
To find out the importance of the various mechanisms for the simulation results, a sensi-
tivity analysis is presented in Appendix 2. Four alternative versions of the model were
studied to this end:
A. a model without a direct effect on the export demand;
B. a model in which the productivity effect of R&D is halved;
C. a model in which the multiplier for the effect of R&D incentives on business R&D
expenditure is halved;
D. a model with a weak, as opposed to a strong Phillips curve effect in the wage
equation, by which the labour market no longer clears completely in the longer term.
Although the results of the different versions of the model show substantial differences,
they all still show very favourable economic effects. Without a direct effect on demand,
the effect on the gross value added in enterprises is about one third less. The same
applies if the productivity effect of R&D is halved. Halving the multiplier results in the
effect on the gross value added being approximately 45% lower. Even in this case the
economic effects of R&D incentives are still high. This means that the beneficial effects
of R&D incentives do not so much depend on the exact value of the multiplier, but that
the beneficial effects of R&D on the economy are determinative for the favourable
economic effects that can be expected from R&D incentives. If a weak Phillips curve
effect is used in the wage equation, then the effect on the gross value added rises by
approximately one third. Employment in enterprises then increases substantially by
0.75%, as opposed to 0.19% in the simulation based on a strong Philips curve effect.
Subsequently, it is useful to compare stimulation of business R&D with other policy
options. Table 8 shows such a comparison. The impulse in each simulation is 0.1% of
                                                                
29 In the longer term, R&D expenditure increases by 7.54% (calculated by volume and
taking into account a real wage increase for R&D personnel of 1.75%, which is assumed
to be equal to the real wage increase for all workers in the business sector), while the
direct effect of government incentives on R&D expenditure is 7.36% (1.04 x 0.1/1.413,
in which 1.413 is the R&D expenditure by enterprises in the original situation as a
percentage of the gross value added in enterprises).
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the gross value added in enterprises in the base year of MESEMET-2: 1997. The table
sets out the long-term results of the following five policy options:
A. R&D stimulation in the business sector;
B. a reduction of tax on profits in the business sector;
C. a reduction in taxes and social security contributions on wages and social benefits;
D. an increase in (semi) public R&D;
E. an increase in educational expenditure.
Table 8 A comparison of different policy options using MESEMET-2; the long-
term results of an impulse amounting to 0.1% of the gross value added in
enterprises (cumulated deviations from the base path)
A B C D E
Gross value added enterprises (volume) % 0.98 0.11 0.04 0.47 0.22
Exports of goods and services (volume) % 2.17 0.02 -0.03 0.93 0.37
Private consumption (volume) % 1.05 0.17 0.18 0.37 0.10
Labour supply % 0.16 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.05
Employment (enterprises +
government)
% 0.16 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.06
Labour productivity enterprises % 0.79 0.09 0.00 0.43 0.25
Real gross wage rate enterprises % 1.75 0.14 0.03 0.98 0.62
Price of domestic goods and services % 0.84 0.01 0.04 0.17 -0.10
Budget balance government (% GDP) D 0.60 -0.04 -0.06 0.22 0.05
The simulations show that R&D stimulation in the business sector has the greatest
economic effect. While an increase in (semi) public R&D and in educational
expenditure also produces considerable effects, they are clearly less than from R&D
incentives in the business sector. The reason being that R&D incentives are the most
successful in promoting the innovation capacity of enterprises and in raising
productivity. (Semi) public R&D and educational expenditure are only partly geared
towards achieving this and consequently contribute less in this respect, on average. In
addition to the economic goals, (semi) public R&D and educational expenditure are also
geared towards broader social goals and should therefore not only be assessed on the
economic effects. It goes without saying that a more targeted impulse for these two sorts
of expenditure, focusing more on promoting the ability to innovate in the business
sector, will have greater economic effects.
Lowering tax on profits and lowering tax and social security contributions on wages and
social benefits make no substantial contribution towards productivity in the business
sector and consequently have much less economic effects in the long term than the
policy options described above. The difference in the economic effects is also expressed
in the consequences for the budget balance of the government. On balance, R&D
stimulation in enterprises, investments in (semi) public R&D and investments in
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education improve the financial position of the government, the tax policy options have
a negative effect on the financial balance of the government.
Given the clearing labour market in the longer term in MESEMET-2, the economic
effects of different policy measures in MESEMET-2 ultimately depend on the effects
that appear in terms of labour productivity and the supply of labour. While the supply of
labour increases to a limited extent in all simulations, the increase is the highest from
R&D incentives. This is due to the considerable real wage increase, which is caused by
the productivity effect and terms of trade gain.
All in all, Table 8 informs us that, when compared with other policy options, R&D
incentives are a very effective means for the government to generate extra economic
growth in the longer term. Considering the relatively strong effect of R&D on labour
productivity in the business sector, R&D incentives also contribute to the desired
transition in the growth pattern of the Dutch economy, namely from factor-driven
growth to innovation-driven growth (see Chapter 2).
Another question is to what level should the government stimulate R&D expenditure in
the business sector. It was already stated in the previous chapter that R&D has
diminishing returns, and thus a certain social optimum will be attached to the total
amount of R&D expenditure. What this optimum is, is difficult to say. However,
something can be said in a more abstract sense about the subsidy percentage that would
be optimal for R&D in terms of society. This can be done on the basis of the differences
given in the literature between the social and the private return to R&D. The studies into
spillovers discussed in Chapter 7 indicate that the social returns to business R&D are on
average 1.5 to 2 times as high as the private returns achieved by the firms that actually
carry out the R&D. In theory, this could justify a subsidy of 33-50% because then a
reduction in the cost of R&D for firms is achieved that could bring the R&D
expenditure by enterprises to the socially desired level.30 The current level of a 9%
average (see Table 2) is far below this level. It goes without saying that in the event of
an eventual intensification of R&D incentives, other funding allocation options must be
taken into account. However, the comparison of the policy options in Table 8 shows
that stimulation of R&D in the business sector is a valid way to generate further growth
in prosperity.
Although the model calculations indicate that the effects of R&D incentives are
considerably more beneficial than those from a reduction in tax on profits, it may not be
concluded that a reduction of the tax burden for enterprises would not be an effective
means of stimulating economic activity. A considerable reduction of tax on profits, for
instance by lowering the corporation tax rate from 35 to 30%, could also make a
                                                                
30 If the social returns are twice as high as the private returns, a 50% reduction in the cost of
R&D will be needed in the business sector to achieve the required social level. If  the
social returns are 1.5 times as high as the private return, this gives us a percentage of 33.
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substantial contribution towards reinforcing the Dutch economy, partly because the
corporation tax is important for the international location decisions of enterprises. Table
8 also shows that a reduction of the corporation tax has a positive effect on the
economy. Nevertheless, the analysis also makes it quite clear that it would be unwise to
reduce the corporation tax at the expense of R&D incentives. In other words, it is not so
much a question of ‘or-or’ but rather one of ‘and-and’.
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10.Conclusion
The economic effects of stimulating business R&D depend on many factors. It is not
solely a matter of the extent to which government incentives lead to extra business
R&D, but also – and particularly – of the direct and spillover effects of that extra R&D
on the economy. Because of the increasing importance of innovative strength for
structural economic development, empirical research into these effects has received a
great deal of attention in recent years. Although a great deal of study still needs to be
carried out in this field, the results to date allow us to make an empirically-based
analysis of the effects of government policy geared towards promoting business R&D.
In this paper we have placed the various sub-aspects that play a role in this respect into
a total framework, both diagrammatically and in the form of a model.
A simulation with the general equilibrium model MESEMET-2 shows that stimulating
business R&D is particularly effective. The simulation shows that a one-guilder extra
government incentive for business R&D produces in the long term, converted for the
year 1997, approximately 10 guilders-worth of extra gross value added in enterprises.
This translates into a substantial increase in labour productivity. As a result of these
beneficial economic effects the budget balance of the government will improve.
Our analysis shows that the economic effects of government incentives for business
R&D are particularly beneficial; it also indicates the lines along which this result is
achieved. The analysis also shows that R&D incentives lead to a higher labour
productivity which, in turn, contributes to the desired transition in the growth pattern of
the Dutch economy from ‘factor-driven’ growth to ‘innovation-driven’ growth.
39
References
Advisory Commission To Study The Consumer Price Index (1996), Toward a More
Accurate Measure of the Cost of Living, Washington D.C: U.S. Senate, Committee
on Finance
Bartelsman, E.J. and J. Hinloopen (2000), Ict en economische groei [ICT and Economic
Growth], ESB, 85(4254), pp. 376-378
Bergeijk, P.A.G. van, M.A. van Dijk, R.C.G. Haffner, G.H.A. van Hagen, R.A. de
Mooij and P.M. Waasdorp (1995), Economic Policy, Technology and Growth,
Beleidsstudies Technologie Economie, no. 30, The Hague: Ministry of Economic
Affairs
Bergeijk, P.A.G. van, G.H.A. van Hagen, R.A. de Mooij and J. van Sinderen (1997),
Endogenizing Technological Progress: The MESEMET Model, Economic
Modelling, 14(3), pp. 341-367
Butter, F.A.G. den and F.J. Wollmer (1992), Endogenising Technical Progress in the
Netherlands, Beleidsstudies Technologie Economie, no. 22, The Hague: Ministry of
Economic Affairs
Butter, F.A.G. den and R.W. van Zijp (1995), Technologie en Werkgelegenheid
[Technology and Employment], Beleidsstudies Technologie Economie, no. 28, The
Hague: Ministry of Economic Affairs
CBS (1999), Kennis en economie 1999 [Knowledge and the Economy 1999], The
Hague: Elsevier
Coe, D.T. and E. Helpman (1995), International R&D Spillovers, European Economic
Review, 39(5), pp. 859-887
CPB (1997), JADE, a Model for the Joint Analysis of Dynamics and Equilibrium,
Working Paper no. 99, The Hague
Donselaar, P. and A. Knoester (1999), R&D-uitgaven van bedrijven: feiten en
verklaringen [R&D Expenditure by Enterprises: Facts and Explanations],
Beleidsstudies Technologie Economie, no. 34, The Hague: Ministry of Economic
Affairs
Donselaar, P., J. van Sinderen and J.P. Verbruggen (2000), MESEMET-2. Een
uitbreiding en actualisering van het MESEMET-model, basisjaar 1997
[MESEMET-2. An Extended and Updated Version of the MESEMET Model, Base
Year 1997], Working Paper 2000/01, The Hague: Ministry of Economic Affairs,
Directorate General for Industry
Economic Policy Committee (2000), Annual Report on Structural Reforms 2000,
Brussels
European Commission (1999), The Competitiveness of European Industry, 1999 Report,
COM(1999) 465, Luxe mbourg
Eurostat (1999), Community Innovation Survey 1997/1998, Statistics in Focus,
Research and Development, no. 2/99, Luxembourg
Eurostat (2000), Survey on Innovation in EU Enterprises, Second Community
Innovation Survey, CD-ROM, Luxembourg
40
Goto, A. and K. Suzuki, (1989), R&D Capital, Rate of Return on R&D Investment and
Spillover of R&D in Japanese Manufacturing Industries, The Review of Economics
and Statistics, 71(4), pp. 555-564
Griliches, Z. (1994), Productivity, R&D, and the Data Constraint, American Economic
Review, 84(1), pp. 1-23
Griliches, Z. and F. Lichtenberg (1984), Interindustry Technology Flows and
Productivity Growth: A Reexamination, The Review of Economics and Statistics,
66(2), pp. 324-329
Grosfeld, T.R.A. (1997), Technologische Diffusie in Nederland [Technology Diffusion
in the Netherlands], doctoral thesis Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Hague:
Ministry of Economic Affairs
Haakman, K. (1999), Werking van R&D spillovers [An Analysis of R&D Spillovers],
doctoral thesis Free University Amsterdam, Zoetermeer: EIM
Hagen, G.H.A. van (1994), Kennis, Technische Vooruitgang en Groei [Knowledge,
Technological Progress and Growth], doctoral thesis Erasmus University Rotterdam,
The Hague: Ministry of Economic Affairs
Hall, B.H. (1996), Fiscal Policy Towards R&D in the United States: Recent Experience,
in: OECD, Fiscal Measures to Promote R&D and Innovation, Committee for
Scientific and Technological Policy, Paris, pp. 65-74
Hollanders, H. and B. Verspagen (1998), De invloed van de sectorstructuur op de
Nederlandse R&D uitgaven [The Influence of the Sectoral Structure on Dutch R&D
Expenditure], Maastricht: MERIT
Hollanders, H. and B. Verspagen (1999), De invloed van de sectorstructuur op de R&D
uitgaven van en het aantal toegekende patenten aan het Nederlandse bedrijfsleven
[The Influence of the Sectoral Structure on the R&D Expenditure by, and the
Number of Patents Granted to the Dutch Business Sector], Maastricht: MERIT
Hollanders, H. and B. ter Weel (2000), Nederland? Kennisland! [The Netherlands?
Land of Knowledge!], ESB , 85(4258), pp. 464-466
Ioannidis, E. and P. Schreyer (1998), Technology and Non-technology Determinants of
Export hare Growth, OECD Economic Studies, 1997/I, no. 28
Jacobs, B., R. Nahuis and P.J.G. Tang (1998), Productivity, R&D and Spillovers in the
Netherlands, CPB Report, 1998/4, pp. 19-22
Jacobs, B., R. Nahuis and P.J.G. Tang (1999), Sectoral Productivity Growth and R&D
Spillovers in the Netherlands, CPB, Research Memorandum no. 149, The Hague
Jaffe, A.B. (1996), Economic Analysis of Research Spillovers: Implications for the
Advanced Technology Program, Gaithersburg, Maryland: U.S. Department of
Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Advanced Technology
Program, GCR 97-708
Kealy, T. (1996), The Economic Laws of Scientific Research, Houndmills/London:
Macmillan Press
Kusters, A.P. (1994), Winstgevendheid en vermogensverhoudingen  [Profitability and
Debt Equity Ratios], CPB, Research Memorandum no. 115, The Hague
Leeuwen, G. van and H.R. Nieuwenhuijsen (1995), R&D-uitgaven en bedrijfsprestaties
[R&D Expenditure and Business Performance], INDEX, CBS, September, pp. 12-13
41
Leeuwen, G. van and H.R. Nieuwenhuijsen (1998a), R&D en bedrijfsprestaties [R&D
and Business Performance], Zoetermeer: EIM/CBS
Leeuwen, G. van and H.R. Nieuwenhuijsen (1998b), R&D is goed voor omzet, werk en
toegevoegde waarde, [R&D Boosts Turnover, Employment and Value Added] ESB,
83(4164), pp. 632-634
Linden, R.M. van der (1997), Technologische innovatie en export  [Technological
Innovation and Export], doctoral thesis Erasmus University Rotterdam
Meijl, H. van (1995), Endogenous Technological Change: The Case of Information
Technology, Maastricht: University Press Maastricht
Ministry of Economic Affairs (1999), Ruimte voor Industriële Vernieuwing: agenda
voor het industrie- en dienstenbeleid [Scope for Industrial Innovation: Industrial
Policy Agenda], The Hague (available in English)
Minne, B. (1997), International Battle of Giants. The Role of Investment in Research
and Fixed Assets, Onderzoeksreeks Marktwerking in Nederland, The Hague:
Ministry of Economic Affairs and OCFEB
Mohnen, P. (1996), R&D Externalities and Productivity Growth, STI Review, no. 18,
pp. 39-66
Nadiri, M.I. (1993), Innovations and Technological Spillovers, NBER, Working paper
no. 4423, Ca mbridge, Massachusetts
Nieuwenhuijsen, H.R. (1999), Een internationale vergelijking van R&D-kapitaal bij
bedrijven [An International Comparison of R&D Capital in the Business Sector],
Zoetermeer: EIM (published in abridged form in Maandschrift Economie, April
2000, under the title ‘Het private R&D-kapitaal van Nederland in internationaal
perspectief’ [The Private R&D Capital in the Netherlands in an International
Perspective])
OECD (1999), OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 1999, Paris:
OECD
OECD (2000a), Main Science and Technology Indicators, 2000/1, Paris: OECD
OECD (2000b), A New Economy? The Changing Role of Innovation and Information
Technology in Growth, Paris: OECD
Porter, M.E. (1990), The Competitive Advantage of Nations, London: Macmillan Press
Porter, M.E. and S. Stern (1999), The New Challenge to America’s Prosperity: Findings
from the Innovation Index, Washington D.C.: Council on Competitiveness
Reininga, F.K. (1994), De relatieve factorintensiteit van de Nederlandse export [The
Relative Factor Intensity of Dutch Exports], ESB , 79(3979), pp. 898-899 and 904
Roelandt, Th.J.A., P.W.L. Gerbrands, H.P. van Dalen and J. van Sinderen (1996),
Onderzoek naar technologie en economie: over witte vlekken en zwarte dozen
[Research into the Relationship between Technology and the Economy: on Blank
Spots and Black Boxes], Beleidsstudies Technologie Economie, no. 31, The Hague:
Ministry of Economic Affairs
Scherer, F.M. (1982), Interindustry Technology Flows and Productivity Growth, The
Review of Economics and Statistics, 64(4), pp. 627-634
42
Scherer, F.M. (1984), Using Linked Patent and R&D Data to Measure Interindustry
Technology Flows, in: Z. Griliches (ed.), R&D, Patents and Productivity, National
Bureau of Economic Research, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 417-
464
SER (1995), Kennis en economie [Knowledge and the Economy], Rapport van de
Commissie Economische Deskundigen, no. 95/04, The Hague
SER (2000), Sociaal-economisch beleid 2000-2004 [Socio-economic Policy 2000-
2004], Advies, no. 00/08, The Hague
Sinderen, J. van (1990), Belastingheffing en economische groei [Taxation and
Economic Growth], Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff
Sinderen, J. van (1993), Taxation and Economic Growth. Some Calculations with a
Macroeconomic Semi-Equilibrium Model for the Dutch Economy (MESEM),
Economic Modelling, 10(3), pp. 285-300
Soete, L.L.G. and B.J. ter Weel (1999), Innovation, Knowledge Creation and
Technology Policy: The Case of the Netherlands, De Economist, 147(3), pp. 293-
310
Terleckyj, N.E. (1980), Direct and Indirect Effects of Industrial Research and
Development on the Productivity Growth of Industries, in: J.W. Kendrick and B.N.
Vaccara (eds.), New Developments in Productivity Measurement and Analysis,
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 359-377
43
Appendix 1
The most important equations in MESEMET-2 for simulations with respect to
R&D
Production capacity
Yp* = 0,66 Lpeff + 0,34 Kpeff
Lpeff = 1/3 Lperd + 2/3 HC
Kpeff = 0,85 KT + 0,15 Kgex
KT = 0,7 Kperd + 0,3 TC
TC = 0,8 TCp + 0,2 TCg
TCp = 0,82 TCp(-1) + 0,18 RDp
TCg = 0,82 TCg(-1) + 0,18 RDg
HC = 0,90 HC (-1) + 0,055 Egau + 0,030 Iperd + 0,010 RDg  + 0,005 RDp – 0,02 Ti’
Ypd = 0,4 Yp + 0,3 Yp(-1) + 0,2 Yp(-2) + 0,1 Yp(-3)
Labour market
Lp = 0,992 Lperd + 0,008 Lprd
Lperd = 0,9 Lperd
d + 0,1 Lsperd
Lperd
d = 0,55 Ypd + 0,45 Lpeff – 0,55 Wpy
Lprd = RDp
Ls = Lsau + 0,15 Wpn’ – 0,08 (Yuo – Lsau) – 0,25 Lu
Lsperd = 1,134 Ls – 0,126 Lg – 0,008 Lprd
Luen = 18,2 Ls – 15,2 Lp – 2,0 Lg
Lu = Luen + Luau
DLu%Ls = 0,055 (Lu – Ls)
Pl = Pl(-1) + (P – P(-1)) + (H – H(-1)) + 0,25 (Tlp – Tlp(-1)) – 0,25 Luen
H = Yp – Lp
Expenditure and production
X = 0,739 Cp + 0,167 Ip + 0,063 Gm + 0,031 Ig
V = 0,571 X  + 0,429 B
Yp = X + 0,75 (B – M)
Yg = 0,783 Lg + 0,217 Dg
Yt = 0,880 Yp + 0,120 Yg
B = Mwau – 2 ER + 0,6 RIC + 0,4 RHC
M = V + 0,75 ER
ER = P – Pfau
RIC = TC – TCfau
RHC = HC – HCfau
P = 2/3 (Lp + Pl) + 1/3 (Yr + P  – 0,0031 ORpau) – 0,75 ER – Yp*
Py  = 1,75 P – 0,75 Pfau
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R&D expenditure
RDp = 100 DRDp%Yp/1,4132 + (Yp + Py) – Prd
DRDp%Yp = 1,04 (0,5 DORp%Yp + 0,3 DORp%Yp(-1) + 0,2 DORp%Yp(-2)) +
1,18 (0,5 DOUp%Yp + 0,5 DOUp%Yp (-1)) + 0,0065 DSOL(-2) –
0,009 DRREN + 0,0045 DINT(-1) + DRDp%Yp,au
DORp%Yp = 0,10358/100 (ORpau – Yp)
DSOL = 0,148 DWQ + 0,673 DSOL(-1)
Prd = 0,553 Pl  + 0,447 P
RDg = 0,8 RDg r,au + 0,2 RDgop,au
Public finance
Ug = 0,457 Yuexiab + 0,021 Yuiab + 0,126 Gm + 0,062 Ig + 0,212 (Lg + Wg)  +
0,002 ORpau + 0,120 Yoau
Tn = 0,844 (Lp + Wp + Tlp) – 0,097 PPp + 0,253 (Yr + Tk’au)
T = 0,783 Tn + 0,106 (Lg + Wg + Tlg) – 0,012 PPg + 0,025 (Yuexiabw + Tuitw) +
0,070 (Wu + UGoau + Tuitog) + 0,025 (Yuexiabo,au + Tuiton) +
0,003 (Yuiab + Tuitia)
DF%Y = 0,444 (T – Ug)
Clarification
Variables printed in italics are in percentage changes, the other variables (preceded by a
D) are in absolute changes. The additions (-1), (-2), etc., after the variables indicate lags,
expressed in years.
The tax rates and tax revenue in the model include social security contributions and the
balance of indirect taxes and subsidies.
The entire model is described in Working Paper 2000/01 of the Directorate General for
Industry of the Ministry of Economic Affairs.31
                                                                
31 Donselaar, Van Sinderen and Verbruggen (2000).
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List of symbols
B Exports of goods and services (volume)
Cp Private consumption (volume), including investments in dwellings and social
benefits in kind32
Dg Depreciation of government physical capital (volume)
Egau Government expenditure on education (volume, exogenous)
ER Relative price level in the Netherlands in comparison with abroad
F%Yt Budget balance of the government as a percentage of GDP at factor costs
Gm Net government consumption of goods and services (volume)
H Labour productivity enterprises (volume)
HC Stock of human capital (volume)
HCfau Stock of human capital abroad (volume, exogenous)
Ig Gross investments government (volume)
INT Internationalisation index for the Dutch economy (1990 = 100), in which the volume
of the relevant world trade is expressed as a ratio to the volume of the gross value
added (at factor costs) in enterprises
Ip Gross investments enterprises (volume)
Iperd Gross investments enterprises (volume), unrelated to R&D
Kgex Government physical capital (volume), unrelated to education and R&D
Kpeff Effective capital input in the production process of enterprises (volume), including
technology capital and government physical capital
Kperd Physical capital in the business sector (volume), unrelated to R&D
KT Effective capital input in the production process of enterprises (volume), including
technology capital and excluding government physical capital
Lg Employment government
Lp Employment enterprises
Lpeff Effective labour input (including human capital) in the production process of
enterprises (volume)
Lperd Employment enterprises, excluding R&D personnel
Lperd
d Labour demand enterprises, excluding R&D personnel
Lprd Employment R&D personnel enterprises
Ls Labour supply
Lsau Labour force (exogenous)
Lsperd Labour supply available for enterprises, excluding R&D personnel
Lu Unemployment
Luau Exogenous (natural) unemployment
Luen Endogenous unemployment
                                                                
32 Private consumption is defined more loosely here than in the National Accounts of the
CBS. Investments in dwellings in the National Accounts are part of the investments in
fixed assets (fixed capital formation), social benefits in kind have been recorded under
the heading of governmental consumption expenditure since the revision of the National
Accounts in 1999.
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Lu%Ls Unemployment as a percentage of labour supply
M Imports of goods and services (volume)
Mwau Relevant world trade (volume, exogenous)
ORpau Government financing of business R&D from central government (real, exogenous)
ORp%Yp Government financing of business R&D from central government as a percentage of
the gross value added (at factor costs) in enterprises
OUp%Yp Government financing of business R&D related to the contracting out of R&D by
(semi) public research institutes, as a percentage of the gross value added (at factor
costs) in enterprises
P Price of domestic goods and services
Pfau Price of foreign goods and services (exogenous)
Pl Nominal gross wage rate enterprises
PPg Pension contributions government (real)
PPp Pension contributions enterprises (real)
Prd Price of R&D in enterprises
Py Price of gross value added enterprises
RDg R&D efforts in (semi) public institutes (volume)
RDgop,au R&D of (semi) public institutes assigned to them by third parties (volume,
exogenous)
RDgr,au R&D of (semi) public institutes financed by the central government (volume,
exogenous)
RDp R&D efforts enterprises (volume)
RDp%Yp R&D  expenditure by enterprises as a percentage of the gross value added (at factor
costs) of enterprises
RDp%Yp,a
u
Autonomous component of R&D expenditure by enterprises as a percentage of the
gross value added (at factor costs) in enterprises
RHC Relative stock of human capital in the Netherlands in comparison with abroad
(volume)
RIC Relative innovation capacity, defined as the relative stock of technology capital
(volume) in the Netherlands in comparison with abroad
RREN Real interest rate
SOL Solvency of enterprises
T Total tax revenue of the government (real)
TC Domestic stock of technology capital (volume)
TCfau Foreign stock of technology capital (volume, exogenous)
TCg Stock of technology capital built up by (semi) public institutes (volume)
TCp Stock of technology capital built up by enterprises (volume)
Ti’ Marginal integrated tax rate on labour income (taxes and contributions + deductions
in connection with income-dependent schemes)
Tk’au Marginal and average tax rate on the gross capital income of enterprises (exogenous)
Tlg Average tax rate on labour income, government
Tlp Average tax rate on labour income, enterprises
Tn Total tax revenue (real), excluding taxes on labour income of government and social
benefits
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Tuit ia Average tax rate on social benefits by virtue of income-dependent schemes
33
Tuitog Average tax rate on non-unemployment-related social benefits in cash (excluding
benefits by virtue of income-dependent schemes)
Tuiton Average tax rate on non-unemployment-related social benefits in kind (excluding
benefits by virtue of income-dependent schemes)
Tuitw Average tax rate on unemployment-related benefits (excluding benefits by virtue of
income-dependent schemes)
Ug Total government expenditure (real)
UGo au Recipients of non-unemployment-related social benefits in cash (exogenous)
V Total expenditure (volume)
Wg Real gross wage rate government
Wp Real gross wage rate enterprises
Wpn’ Effective real wage rate in enterprises (real wage rate in enterprises after deduction
of taxes and contributions, and adjusted for deductions in connection with income-
dependent schemes)
Wpy Real labour costs enterprises
WQ Net profit ratio enterprises
Wu Real benefit level of unemployment-related social benefits and non-unemployment-
related social benefits in cash (excluding benefits by virtue of income-dependent
schemes)
X Total national expenditure (volume)
Yg Gross value added at factor costs of the government (volume)
Yoau Balance of other payments made by government to enterprises and households (real,
exogenous)
Yp Gross value added at factor costs in enterprises (volume)
Yp* Production capacity enterprises (volume)
Ypd Desired production capacity enterprises (volume)
Yr Gross capital income enterprises (volume)
Yt Gross domestic product at factor costs (volume)
Yuexiab Social benefits, excluding benefits by virtue of income-dependent schemes, gross
(real)
Yuexiabo,au Yuexiab, non-unemployment-related, in kind (real, exogenous)
Yuexiabw Yuexiab, unemployment-related (real)
Yuiab Social benefits by virtue of income-dependent schemes, gross (real)
Yuo Basic amount in benefits by virtue of income-dependent schemes, net (real)
                                                                
33 This only relates to the balance of indirect taxes and subsidies on private consumption.
The same applies with regard to the variable Tuiton.
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Appendix 2
Sensitivity analysis MESEMET-2 for R&D incentives variant
Table A1 Sensitivity analysis of the long-term effects of government incentives for
business R&D amounting to 0.1% of the gross value added in enterprises
(cumulated deviations from the base path)
Standard A B C D
gross value added enterprises (volume) % 0.98 0.67 0.67 0.53 1.32
exports of goods and services (volume) % 2.17 0.75 1.80 1.10 2.61
imports of goods and services (volume) % 2.09 0.17 2.02 1.09 2.32
private consumption (volume) % 1.05 0.29 0.95 0.59 1.18
gross investments enterprises (volume) % 0.85 0.11 0.83 0.53 1.35
R&D expenditure enterprises (volume) % 7.54 7.10 7.64 3.79 7.97
stock of technology capital enterprises (vol.) % 7.54 7.10 7.64 3.79 7.97
stock of human capital (volume) % 0.61 0.37 0.44 0.34 0.79
stock of physical capital enterprises (volume)1 % 0.79 0.06 0.78 0.50 1.30
labour supply % 0.16 0.05 0.14 0.08 0.54
employment enterprises % 0.19 0.06 0.16 0.10 0.75
unemployment (% of labour supply) D -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.12
labour productivity enterprises % 0.79 0.61 0.51 0.43 0.56
real gross wage rate enterprises % 1.75 0.58 1.53 0.93 1,22
price of domestic goods and services % 0.84 -0.38 1.02 0.43 0.77
price of value added enterprises % 1.48 -0.66 1.79 0.75 1.34
budget balance government (% GDP) D 0.60 0.12 0.52 0.29 0.71
current account of balance of payments (% GDP) D 0.61 0.13 0.53 0.29 0.69
1 Excluding physical capital related to R&D.
Standard: standard version of MESEMET-2. A, B, C en D: adjusted versions of the
model.
A Excluding the direct effect on export demand. Exports equation without the effect of
RIC and RHC, i.e. B = Mwau – 2 ER.
B Productivity effect of business R&D and (semi) public R&D, halved. Equation for
KT adjusted as follows: KT = 0,85 Kperd + 0,15 TC. Equation for HC adjusted as
follows: HC = 0,90 HC(-1) + 0,0600 Egau + 0,0325 Iperd + 0,0050 RDg  + 0,0025
RDp – 0,02 Ti’.
C Multiplier for the effect of R&D incentives on R&D expenditure in the business
sector, halved. Coefficient for DORp%Yp in equation for DRDp%Yp is now 0,52
instead of 1,04.
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D In the wage equation, a weak instead of a strong Phillips curve effect. Equation for
Pl adjusted as follows: Pl = Py + 0,34 (P  – Py) + H + 0,25 Tlp – 1,48 DLu%Ls. The
coefficient for DLu%Ls is taken from the wage equation in the JADE model of the
CPB (1997). To do justice to the theoretical background of the CPB equation
(bargaining model with endogenous equilibrium unemployment), the price variable
P is replaced with Py + 0.34 (P – Py), in conformity with the CPB equation.
